

# EVALUATING PROBABILITY FORECASTS FOR GDP DECLINES

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**Abstract:** Using evaluation methodologies for rare events from meteorology and psychology, we examine the value of probability forecasts of real GDP declines during the current and each of the next four quarters using data from the *Survey of Professional Forecasters*. We study the quality of these probability forecasts in terms of calibration, resolution, odds ratio, the relative operating characteristic (ROC), and alternative variance decompositions. Even though QPS and the calibration tests for perfect forecast validity for all five horizons were accepted, the other approaches clearly identify the longer-term forecasts (Q3-Q4) having no skill. For a given hit rate of (say) 90%, the associated high false alarm rates that underlie the longer-term forecasts make these unusable in practice. We find conclusive evidence that the shorter-term forecasts (Q0-Q2) possess significant skill in terms of all measures considered, even though they are characterized by excess variability.

*Key Words:* Survey of Professional Forecasters, Subjective probability, Verification decomposition, Calibration, Resolution, Skill score, Relative Operating Characteristics, Odds ratio, Recession.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Forecasting rare or relatively uncommon business events such as recessions or financial crises has long been a challenging issue in business and economics. As witnessed during past few decades, the track record of large scale structural macro and VAR models, or real GDP forecasts that are obtained from professional surveys (e.g., Blue Chip, Survey of Professional Forecasters, OECD, etc.), in predicting or even timely recognizing postwar recessions has not been impressive. Even for probability forecasts based on modern time series models, the improvement in forecast performance has been limited.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper we will study the usefulness of the subjective probability forecasts that are obtained from the *Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)* as predictors of GDP downturns using several distinct evaluation methodologies. Even though these forecasts are available since 1968, and have drawn media attention, very little systematic analysis has been conducted to look into their usefulness as possible business cycle indicators.<sup>2</sup> The traditional and the most popular way of evaluating probability forecasts is the Mean Square Error (MSE) type of measure such as Brier's Quadratic Probability Score (QPS), which evaluates the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the realization of the event. This approach, however, can fail to identify the ability of a forecasting system to evaluate the odds of the occurrence of an event against its non-occurrence, which is a very important characteristic to the users of forecasts. A high performance score can be achieved by totally unskilled forecasts having little information value. Thus, the traditional approach can be inadequate in evaluating the usefulness of

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<sup>1</sup> Forecasting failures have been documented extensively in the literature, see, for instance, McNees (1991), Zarnowitz and Moore (1991), Filardo (1999, 2004), Fildes and Stekler (2002), Juhn and Loungani (2002), and Krane (2003). For models generating probability forecasts, see Neftci (1984), Kling (1987), Hamilton (1989), Zellner *et al.* (1991), Stock and Watson (1991, 1993), and Fair (1993).

<sup>2</sup> Notable exceptions include Braun and Yaniv (1992), Graham (1996), Stock and Watson (2003), Lahiri and Wang (2006), and Clements (2006a, 2006b).

probability forecasts, particularly for rare events.<sup>3</sup> We will try to pinpoint the importance of alternative evaluation approaches and emphasize the more important characteristics of a set of forecasts from the standpoint of end-users.

Granger and Pesaran (2000a, 2000b) have developed the methodology of using probability forecasts in a decision theoretic framework. They have argued that due to economists' preoccupation with point forecasts, the generated probabilities from Logit, Probit or other limited dependent variable models are seldom subjected to diagnostic verifications developed in other disciplines. Often the conventional goodness-of-fit statistics like the pseudo R-square, fraction correctly predicted, etc. fail to identify the type I and type II errors in predicting the event of interest. Since survey probabilities embody important additional information over point forecasts, an analysis of the probability forecasts can provide us with an opportunity to understand the reasons for forecast failures, and can possibly help define limits to the current capability of macro economic forecasts, *cf.* Granger (1996).

The plan of this paper is as follows: In section 2, we will introduce the data, and explain the set up. In section 3, we will evaluate the probability forecasts using the traditionally popular calibration approach with statistical tests. In section 4, we will explore the multi-dimension nature of the probability forecasts using alternative methodologies. In section 5, we will suggest some effective ways to evaluate the performance of the probability forecasts of rare business events in terms of odds ratio and ROC curve. Finally, concluding remarks will be summarized in section 6.

## **2. SPF PROBABILITY FORECASTS OF REAL GDP DECLINE**

The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)<sup>4</sup> has been collecting subjective probability forecasts of real GDP/GNP declines during the current and four subsequent quarters since

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<sup>3</sup> See Doswell *et al.* (1990), Murphy (1991) and Stephenson (2000) for more discussion on this issue.

<sup>4</sup> Formerly the surveys were carried out under the auspices of the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research (ASA-NBER). Since June 1990, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has conducted the survey. See Croushore (1993) for an introduction to SPF.

its inception in 1968. At the end of the first month of each quarter, the individual forecasters in SPF form their forecasts. The survey collects probability assessments for a decline in real GDP in the current quarter, and in each of the next four quarters conditional on the growth in the current period. The number of respondents has varied between 15 and 60 over the quarters. Since our aim in this study is to evaluate the SPF probability forecasts at the macro level, we use forecasts averaged over individuals.<sup>5</sup> Using the July revisions, during our sample period from 1968:4 to 2004:2, there were 20 quarters of negative GDP growth -- those beginning 1969:4, 1973:4, 1980:1, 1981:3, 1990:3 and 2001:1 -- which consist of six separate episodes of real GDP declines. Thus, only about 14% in the entire sample of 143 quarters exhibited negative GDP growth. The annualized real time real GDP growth issued every July is used as the forecasting target, against which the forecasting performance of the SPF forecasts will be evaluated.<sup>6</sup> The SPF probabilities for real GDP declines during the current and next four quarters are depicted against the real time real GDP growth in Figures 1a -1e. The shaded bars represent the NBER defined recessions.

From Figures 1a-1e, several notable patterns can be observed. First, the mean probabilities generated by the professional forecasters fluctuate over time, varying from as high as 80% to as low as less than 5%. Second, the fluctuations in the probabilities seem to be roughly coincident with those real GDP growth and the NBER defined peaks and troughs. Third, for different forecasting horizons, the probabilities either precede or follow the cyclical movement of the real GDP with different leads or lags. Finally, the high end of the mean probability tends to decrease as the forecasting horizon increases. As shown in the figures, the high-end probability decreases steadily from about 80% for the current quarter to only about 30% for three and four-quarter-ahead forecasts. All these observations suggest that the information content, hence the value, of the SPF probability forecasts may be horizon-dependent.

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<sup>5</sup> In future we would like to consider the optimum combination of the individual probability forecasts. Based on nine selected forecasters, Graham (1996) found that pooling techniques that allow for correlation between forecasts performed better than the simple average of forecasts.

<sup>6</sup> We also conducted our analysis with the 30-day announcements as the real time data. Results were virtually unchanged. All real time data were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia web site.

### 3. CALIBRATION OF *SPF* PROBABILITY FORECASTS

The traditional way of evaluating probability forecasts for the occurrence of a binary event is to assess the calibration of the forecasts against realizations, that is, to assess the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the actual occurrence of the event.

#### 3.1. Brier's Quadratic Probability Score

A measure-oriented approach simply compares the forecast probability with the realization of a binary event that is represented by a dummy variable taking value 1 or 0 depending upon the occurrence of the event. A most commonly used measure is Brier's Quadratic Probability Score (*QPS*), a probability analog of mean squared error, *i.e.*:

$$QPS = 1/T \sum_{t=1}^T (f_t - x_t)^2 \quad (1)$$

where  $f_t$  is the forecast probability made at time  $t$ ,  $x_t$  is the realization of the event (1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise) at time  $t$ .  $T$  is the total number of the observations or forecasting quarters in our case.

The *QPS* ranges from 0 to 1 with a score of 0 corresponding to perfect accuracy, and is a function only of the difference between the assessed probabilities and realizations. The calculated *QPS* for each forecasting horizon from the current quarter (Q0) to the next four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) are calculated to be 0.077, 0.098, 0.103, 0.124, and 0.127, respectively. Thus, even though these scores deteriorate as the forecast horizon increases, all seem to suggest good calibration and are close to zero. It may be noted that *QPS* figures are seldom reported with their associated standard errors. In next section, we will show that these figures, indeed, are not significantly different from their respective expectations under the hypothesis of perfect forecast validity.

#### 3.2 Prequential Test for Calibration

Dawid (1984) and Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) (henceforward SM-D) suggested a test for calibration-in-the-small when a sequence of  $T$  probability forecasts is grouped in probability intervals, *e.g.*, as in Table 1. Let us denote  $r_j = \sum_{t=1}^{T_j} x_{tj}$  ( $j = 1, \dots, J$ ) as the actual number of times the event actually occurred when the number of issued probabilities belonging to the probability group  $j$  (with midpoint  $f_j$ ) is  $T_j$  ( $T = \sum_{j=1}^J T_j$ ), and  $x_{tj}$  is the binary outcome index (=1 if the event occurs) for the  $t^{\text{th}}$  occasion in which forecast  $f_j$  was offered. Then  $e_j = f_j T_j$  is the expected number of occurrences in the group  $j$ . The SM-D test statistic for calibration or accuracy in each probability group is obtained as the weighted difference between the predictive probability and the realization of the event  $Z_j = (r_j - e_j) / \sqrt{w_j}$ , where  $w_j$  is the weight determined by  $w_j = T_j f_j (1 - f_j)$ . If the  $Z_j$  statistic lies too far out in the tail of the standard normal distribution, it might be regarded as evidence against forecast accuracy for the probability group  $j$ . The overall performance of the forecasts for all  $j$  can be evaluated using the test statistic  $\sum Z_j^2$ , which is distributed asymptotically  $\chi^2$  with  $j$  degrees of freedom. Thus, a forecaster would exhibit good calibration-in-the-small if on 70% of the times when he or she forecasts a 0.7 chance of GDP decline, it actually declines, if 10% of the times when he or she forecasts a 0.1 chance of a GDP decline, it actually declines, and so forth. Using SM-D calibration test, the accuracy of probability forecasts can be statistically assessed with explicitly expressed uncertainty as indicated by the confidence level.

The results from the SM-D test to assess the SPF probability forecasts for all five quarters are reported in Table 2 where we find that the forecasts of all forecasting horizons appear to be well calibrated. The detailed calculations are presented in Table 1 for only Q0. The  $\chi^2$  values for each forecasting horizon fall into the acceptance area with confidence level of 95% and the degrees of freedom determined by the number of non-zero elements

in each column in Table 2. While the values of  $\chi^2$  statistics vary from 3.49 to 12.68, surprisingly the lowest value of  $\chi^2$  is obtained for the four-quarter-ahead forecasts (Q4).<sup>7</sup>

Given  $QPS = 1/T \sum_{t=1}^T (f_t - x_t)^2$ , SM-D showed how their calibration test could be converted to a test of  $QPS$  being significantly different from its expected value  $1/T \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(1-f_t)$  under the hypothesis of perfect forecast validity using a standard  $N$  (0,1) approximation for the distribution of

$$Y_n = \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T (1-2f_t)(x_t - f_t) \right] / \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T (1-2f_t)^2 f_t(1-f_t) \right]^{1/2} \quad (2)$$

When probability forecasts are grouped,  $Y_n$  can be calculated as:

$$Y_n = \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{11} (1-2f_j)(r_j - e_j) \right] / \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{11} T_j f_j (1-f_j) (1-2f_j)^2 \right]^{1/2}. \quad (3)$$

The test results are reported in Table 2 as well. We find that, for all forecast horizons, none of the calculated statistics fall in the (one-sided) rejection region at the 5% significance level, which is consistent with the SM-D calibration test results that forecasts for all horizons satisfy the hypothesis of perfect forecast validity.

#### 4. FURTHER DIAGNOSTIC VERIFICATIONS

Some of the results from the calibration tests in the previous section may seem counter-intuitive. While the probability forecasts for the longer forecasting horizons, especially Q3 and Q4, never exceed 0.40 even when the event has already occurred, the SM-D test showed that they are well calibrated. This observation leads to a question of whether the calibration is an adequate measure of forecast validity, and why, if it is not. The issue may be analyzed using some alternative approaches.

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<sup>7</sup> Using a Bayesian posterior odds approach, it will be interesting to study the analytical power of the SM-D test against alternatives such as Q3 or Q4 forecasts. We should, however, emphasize that a more powerful calibration test will not minimize the importance of other evaluation approaches discussed in this paper.

#### 4.1. The Skill Score

Skill Score (SS) measures the relative accuracy of a forecast compared to a benchmark.

We calculated the bellwether skill measure

$$SS(f, x) = 1 - [QPS(f, x) / QPS(\mu_x, x)] \quad (4)$$

where  $QPS(\mu_x, x)$  is the accuracy associated with the constant base rate or the constant

relative frequency forecast (CRFF)  $\mu_x$ , which is estimated as  $\bar{x} = (1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{t=1}^{T_j} x_{tj} = 0.14$  in

our sample. For forecasting horizons Q0-Q4, we found the SS values to be 0.36, 0.19, 0.05, -0.002, and -0.05, respectively. Note that the use of this historical average value as the base rate presumes substantial knowledge on part of the forecasters.<sup>8</sup> While the skill score for the shorter run forecasts (Q0-Q1) indicate substantial improvement of the SPF forecasts over the benchmark base rate forecast, the longer run forecasts (Q3 and Q4) do not show any clear-cut relative advantage. The value of Q2 forecasts is marginally positive. These results were not discernable using the calibration tests.

Note that the skill score in (4) can be decomposed as (*cf.* Murphy (1988)):

$$SS(f, x) = \rho_{fx}^2 - [\rho_{fx} - (\sigma_f / \sigma_x)]^2 - [(\mu_f - \mu_x) / \sigma_x]^2 \quad (5)$$

where  $\rho_{fx}$  is the correlation coefficient between forecast and the actual binary outcome,  $\sigma_f^2$  and  $\sigma_x^2$  are their true variances, and  $(\mu_f, \mu_x)$  are the respective means. The decomposition shows that SS is simply the square of the correlation between  $f$  and  $x$  adjusted for any miscalibration penalty (second term) and the normalized difference in the sample averages of the actual and the forecast (third term). This decomposition for Q0-Q4 are given in Table 3a where we find that the last two terms of the decomposition are close to zero, and thus, the skills for Q0-Q4 forecasts in effect reflect the correlations between the forecasts and the actual. For Q0, Q1, and Q2, these correlations are 0.393,

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<sup>8</sup> Alternatively, one can consider using the last realization as the forecast to form a binary time varying base rate. Thus, for current and next four quarters, the last quarter realization is used. The associated skill scores

of SPF forecasts were significantly more than those with  $\bar{x} = 0.14$  implying that the latter base rate is considerably more informative than the use of the lagged actual. Other base rate alternatives, *e.g.*, eternal optimist ( $f=0$ ), eternal pessimist ( $f=1$ ), or a coin flipper ( $f=0.5$ ), are also considerably less informative than the alternative in (5); *cf.* Zellner *et al.* (1991). Diebold and Kilian (2001) have developed measures of predictability of short-term forecasts relative to a long term forecast based on skill scores.

0.220, and 0.077 respectively, and are found to be statistically significant using the simple t-test for no correlation.<sup>9</sup> The correlations for Q3-Q4 are very small and statistically insignificant. This decomposition again shows that the long-term probability forecasts have no skill compared to the benchmark forecast even though they seem to be well calibrated like the near term forecasts.

## 4.2 The Murphy Decomposition

In addition to calibration, there are several other features that also characterize good probability forecasts. Murphy (1972) decomposed the *QPS* or the Brier Score into three components:

$$QPS(f, x) = \sigma_x^2 + E(\mu_{x|f} - f)^2 - E(\mu_{x|f} - \mu_x)^2 \quad (6)$$

where  $E(\cdot)$  is the expectation operator, and  $\mu_{x|f}$  is the conditional mean of  $x$  given the probability forecast  $f$ . Rewriting *QPS* for grouped data

$$QPS(f, x) = (1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{t=1}^{T_j} (f_j - x_{jt})^2, \quad (7)$$

the Murphy decomposition in (6) can be expressed as

$$QPS(f, x) = \bar{x}(1 - \bar{x}) + (1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J T_j (\bar{x}_j - f_j)^2 - (1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J T_j (\bar{x}_j - \bar{x})^2 \quad (8)$$

where  $\bar{x}_j = (1/T_j) \sum_{t=1}^{T_j} x_{jt}$  is the relative frequency of event's occurrence over  $T_j$  occasions

with forecast  $f_j$ , *i.e.*,  $\bar{x}_j (= r_j/T_j)$  is an estimate of  $\mu_{x|f}$  using grouped data.

The first term on the RHS of (8) is the variance of the observations, and can be interpreted as the *QPS* of constant forecasts equal to the base rate. It represents forecast difficulty. The second term on the RHS of (8) represents the calibration or reliability of the forecasts, which measures the difference between the conditional mean of the occurrence on the probability group and the forecast probability. It can be interpreted as a

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<sup>9</sup> The t-values were obtained from a regression of  $(\rho_{\hat{x}}/\sigma_x^2) x$  on  $f$ .

labeling skill that expresses uncertainty. The third term on the RHS of (8) is a measure of resolution or discrimination; it refers to the ability of a set of probability forecasts to sort individual outcomes into probability groups which differ from the long-run relative frequency. In general, it is desirable for the relative frequency of occurrence of the event to be larger (smaller) than the unconditional relative frequency of occurrence when  $f$  is larger (smaller). Note that a sample of probability forecasts will be completely resolved if the forecast probabilities only take values zero and one. For perfectly calibrated forecasts,  $\mu_{x|f} = f$  and  $\mu_x = \mu_f$ , and the resolution term equals the variance of the forecasts,  $\sigma_f^2$ . Forecasts possess positive *absolute* skill when the resolution reward exceeds the miscalibration penalty. Even though calibration is a natural feature to have, it is resolution that makes the forecasts useful in practice, *cf.* DeGroot and Fienberg (1983).<sup>10</sup>

Following Murphy and Winkler (1992), the conditional distributions  $p(x | f)$  for Q0-Q4 are depicted in Figures 2a-2e. In these figures, estimates of  $\mu_{x|f}$  are plotted against  $f$ , and referred to as the attributes diagram. The calculations are presented in Tables 2b and 2c. Figures 2a-2e indicate the relationship between  $\mu_{x|f}$  and  $f$  for the relevant sample of forecasts and observations, and also contain several reference or benchmark lines. The straight 45° line for which  $\mu_{x|f} = f$  represents perfectly calibrated forecasts. The horizontal line represents completely unresolved forecasts, for which  $\mu_{x|f} = \mu_x$ . The dotted line equidistant between the 45° line and the horizontal line represents forecasts with zero skill in terms of SS where the resolution award is equal to the miscalibration penalty. To the right (left) of the vertical auxiliary line at  $f = \mu_x$ , skill is positive above (below) the zero-skill line and negative below (above) it. This is because, when  $\mu_{x|f}$  is on the right (left) of the vertical line and above (below) the zero-skill line, the resolution award will be greater than the miscalibration penalty. Hence, the *QPS* of the SPF would

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<sup>10</sup> Dawid (1986) presents a simple example to distinguish between calibration and resolution. Suppose the event (=1) occurs in every alternative period as 0, 1, 0, 1, .... Consider three sets of forecasts:  $F_1$  assigns 0.5 always;  $F_2$  assigns 0, 1, 0, 1, ..., and  $F_3$  assigns 1, 0, 1, 0, .... Here  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  are well calibrated, but  $F_2$  is perfect whereas  $F_1$  is almost useless. Both  $F_2$  and  $F_3$  are perfectly resolved, but  $F_3$  is not well calibrated.  $F_3$  is more useful than  $F_1$  once we know how to calibrate  $F_3$ .

be smaller than that of the base rate, leading to a positive SS. Thus, Figures 2a-2e permit qualitative evaluation of resolution and skill as well as calibration for individual values of forecasts. An examination of Figures 2a-2e indicates that, similar to the previous findings, the SPF forecasts with shorter forecasting horizons (Q0-Q2) are generally well calibrated; most points on the empirical curves fall in regions of positive skill. However, SPF forecasts with longer forecasting horizons (Q3-Q4) reveal less satisfactory performance with negative overall skill scores.

In Figures 3a – 3e, the graph is split into two conditional likelihood distributions given  $x = 1$  (GDP decline) and  $x = 0$  (no GDP decline). For these two conditional distributions, the means were calculated to be (0.56, 0.38, 0.26, 0.19 and 0.18) for  $x = 1$  and (0.14, 0.16, 0.17, 0.17 and 0.18) for  $x = 0$ , respectively. Good discriminatory forecasts will give two largely non-overlapping marginal distributions, and, in general, the ratio of their vertical differences should be as large as possible. While the shorter run forecasts (Q0-Q2) display better discriminatory power, the longer run forecasts (Q3-Q4) display poor discrimination due to the over-use of low probabilities during both regimes (*i.e.*,  $x = 0$  and  $x = 1$ ). So the two distributions overlap. In particular, the mean values for  $x = 1$  (GDP decline) and  $x = 0$  (no GDP decline) for the 4-quarter ahead forecasts (Q4) are almost identical.<sup>11</sup>

Numerical values of the Murphy decomposition are given in Table 4 where we find that *QPS* improves by about 35%, 16% and 6% for the current (Q0), one quarter- (Q1), and 2-quarter-ahead (Q2) forecasts, respectively, over the constant relative frequency forecast (CRFF). The 3-quarter-ahead (Q3) forecasts are even with CRFF, and the *QPS* of the 4-quarter-ahead (Q4) forecasts are worse by nearly 4%.

The major contributor for the improvement in *QPS* is resolution, which helps to reduce the baseline *QPS* (CRFF) by about 47%, 25%, 17%, 6%, and 8% for Q0 to Q4,

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<sup>11</sup> Cramer (1999) suggested the use of this difference in the conditional means as a goodness-of-fit measure in binary choice models with unbalanced samples where one outcome dominates the sample. See also Greene (2003).

respectively. On the other hand, the miscalibration increases *QPS* of CRFF by 12%, 9%, 11%, 5% and 13%, respectively – they are relatively small for all forecast horizons. The improvement due to resolution is greater than the deterioration due to miscalibration for the up to 2-quarter-ahead forecasts, and the situation is opposite for the 4-quarter-ahead forecasts. In the case of 3-quarter-ahead forecasts, resolution and miscalibration pretty much cancel each other out. As indicated by the attributes diagrams (Figs. 2a-2e) and the overlapping of the  $p(f|x=1)$  distribution with  $p(f|x=0)$  (Figs. 3a-3e), the SPF forecasters are conservative in assigning high probability during quarters when recession occurs. This also suggests that distinguishing between occurrences and non-occurrences, and assigning higher probabilities in quarters when recession occurs, can improve the resolution of the forecasts. It may be noted that the assignment of low probability for rare events is not unusual, and is actually quite common in many other areas of forecasting. When the diagnostic information or “cue” is not adequate to make informed forecasts, the tendency for the forecaster is to assign the average base rate probability.<sup>12</sup>

### 4.3 The Yates Decomposition

The calibration component in (8) can be written as:

$$(1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J T_j (f_j - \bar{x}_j)^2 = s_f^2 + (\bar{f} - \bar{x})^2 - 2s_{fx} + (1/T) \sum_{j=1}^J T_j (\bar{x}_j - \bar{x})^2 \quad (9)$$

where  $\bar{f}$ ,  $s_f^2$  and  $s_{fx}$  are the sample forecast mean, variance and covariance respectively. Since the last term in equation (9) is the resolution component in (8), Yates (1982) and Yates and Curley (1985) have argued that the calibration and resolution components in the Murphy decomposition are algebraically confounded with each other, and suggested a covariance decomposition of *QPS* that is more basic and more revealing than the Murphy decomposition, see also Björkman (1994) and Yates (1994). The so-called Yates decomposition is written as:

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<sup>12</sup> Diebold and Rudebusch (1989, 1991) and Lahiri and Wang (1994) used *QPS* and its resolution and calibration components to study the value of recession forecasts generated from probability models of Neftci (1984) and Hamilton (1989), respectively. Bessler and Ruffley (2004) have studied probability forecasts from a 3-variable VAR model of stock returns by a bootstrap-type procedure under the normality assumption. They found forecasts to be well calibrated but have very low resolution to be useful.

$$QPS(f, x) = \mu_x(1 - \mu_x) + \Delta\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_{f,\min}^2 + (\mu_f - \mu_x)^2 - 2\sigma_{f,x} \quad (10)$$

where  $\sigma_{f,\min}^2 = (\mu_{f|x=1} - \mu_{f|x=0})^2 \mu_x(1 - \mu_x)$ , and  $\Delta\sigma_f^2 = \sigma_f^2 - \sigma_{f,\min}^2$ .

As noted before, the outcome index variance  $\sigma_x^2 = \mu_x(1 - \mu_x)$  provides a benchmark reference for the interpretation of  $QPS$ . The conditional minimum forecast variance  $\sigma_{f,\min}^2$  reflects the double role that the variance of the forecast plays in forecasting performance. Even though minimization of  $\sigma_f^2$  will reduce  $QPS$ , this minimum value of forecast variance will be achieved only when a constant forecast is offered. But a constant forecast would lead to zero covariance between the forecast and event, which will, in turn, increase  $QPS$ . So the solution is to minimize the forecast variance given the covariance that demonstrates the fundamental forecast ability of the forecasters. The conditional minimum value of forecast variance (*i.e.*,  $\sigma_{f,\min}^2 = \sigma_f^2$ ) is achieved when the forecaster has perfect foresight such that he or she can exhibit perfect discrimination of the instances in which the event does and does not occur.

Since  $\Delta\sigma_f^2 = \sigma_f^2 - \sigma_{f,\min}^2$ , the term may be considered as the excess variability in forecasts. If the covariance indicates how responsive the forecaster is to information related to an event's occurrence,  $\Delta\sigma_f^2$  might reasonably be taken as a reflection of how responsive the forecaster is to information that is not related to the event's occurrence. Note that  $\Delta\sigma_f^2$  can be expressed as  $(T_1\sigma_{f|x=1}^2 + T_0\sigma_{f|x=0}^2)/T$ , where  $T_i (i = 0,1)$  is the number of periods associated with the occurrence ( $i = 1$ ) and non-occurrence ( $i = 0$ ),  $T_1 + T_0 = T$ . So the term is the weighted mean of the conditional forecast variances.

Using the SPF probability forecasts, the components of equation (10) were computed and presented in Table 5. Note that the  $QPS$  values and the variances for Q0-Q4 in Tables 4 and 5 are slightly different because the Yates decomposition could be done with ungrouped data whereas the Murphy decomposition was done with probabilities grouped as in Tables 1 and 2. For the shorter forecasting horizons up to 2-quarters (Q0-Q2), the

overall  $QPS$  values are less than the constant relative frequency forecast variance, which demonstrate the absolute skillfulness of the SPF probability forecasts. For the longer run forecasting horizons (Q3-Q4), the overall  $QPS$ s are slightly higher than those of the constant relative frequency forecast. The primary contributor of the performance is the covariance term that helps reduce the forecast variance by almost 84%, 44%, 18% and 5% for up to 3-quarter-ahead forecasts, but makes no contribution for the 4-quarter-ahead forecasts. The covariance reflects the forecaster's ability to make a distinction between individual occasions in which the event might or might not occur. It assesses the sensitivity of the forecaster to specific cues that are indicative of what will happen in the future. It also shows whether the responsiveness to the cue is oriented in the proper direction. This decomposition is another way of reaching the same conclusion as the decomposition of skill score in Table 3a.

The excess variability of the forecasts,  $\Delta\sigma_f^2 = \sigma_f^2 - \sigma_{f,\min}^2$ , for each horizon is found to be 0.0330, 0.0212, 0.0113, 0.0046, and 0.0040, respectively. Compared to the overall forecast variances 0.0541, 0.0272, 0.0123, 0.0047, and 0.004, the excess variability's of SPF probability forecasts are 61%, 77%, 91%, 97% and 100% for Q0-Q4 forecasts, respectively. Thus, they are very high, and this means that the subjective probabilities are scattered unnecessarily around  $\mu_{f|x=1}$  and  $\mu_{f|x=0}$ . Since the difference in conditional means,  $\mu_{f|x=1} - \mu_{f|x=0}$ , are very close to zero for Q3-Q4 forecasts, all of their variability is attributed to excess variability. Assigning low probabilities in periods when GDP actually fell seems to be the root cause of the excess variance. In our sample real GDP fell 20 times. However, in 10 of these quarters, the assigned probabilities for Q0-Q2 forecasts never exceeded 0.5; for Q3-Q4 forecasts, the assigned probabilities were even below 0.2. In contrast, for Q0-Q2, in more than 90% of the quarters when GDP growth did not decline, the probabilities were assigned correctly below 50% (for Q3-Q4 the probabilities were below 30%). This explains why  $Var(f|x=1)$  is much larger than  $Var(f|x=0)$  when the forecasts have any discriminatory power (*cf.* Figs. 3a-3e). The Yates decomposition gives this critical diagnostic information about the SPF probability forecasts that the Murphy decomposition could not.

Overall, both the Murphy and Yates decompositions support the usefulness of shorter run SPF probabilities as predictors of negative real GDP growth, and suggest ways of improving the forecasts, particularly at short-run horizons. The longer-term forecasts have very little discriminatory power. While the overall accuracy or the calibration of the forecasts are very similar for each forecasting horizon, the usefulness of the shorter run forecasts primarily comes from their better discriminatory power. These probabilities embody effective information related to the occurrence of the event, and the overall average forecast probabilities are close to the relative frequency of the occurrence of the event. However, improvement can be made by further distinguishing factors related to the occurrence of quarterly GDP declines, while keeping the sensitivity of the forecasts to information that are actually related to such an event. This would imply a reduction of unnecessary variance of forecasts particularly during GDP declines, thereby increasing resolution further. This is an important economic insight regarding business cycle forecasting that can be gleaned from SPF probability forecasts.<sup>13</sup>

## **5. RELATIVE (RECEIVER) OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC (ROC)**

As the Murphy and Yates decompositions indicated, the traditional measure - the overall calibration or accuracy (or calibration-at-large) - can be decomposed into two distinct components. The calibration by group (or calibration-at-small), as assessed by SM-D validity test, is only one of the characteristics that a forecast possesses. Resolution or discrimination is another, and actually a more important feature to a forecast end-user. However, one vital issue is that, when the resolution is high and the judgment is accurate, the overall calibration will be good or even perfect. But if the resolution is high and the judgment is not accurate, the increased resolution may, instead, cause poor calibration score. Given the inability of any forecaster to forecast perfectly, the frequent trade-off between the calibration and resolution is unavoidable. In this case, if the performance is measured by the traditional calibration and the *QPS* is used as the metric, it may

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<sup>13</sup> Clements (2006b) finds little evidence that the asymmetry in forecasters' loss functions can possibly explain the relatively low forecast probabilities for impending real GDP declines.

encourage hedging behavior as is evidenced by the preponderance of assigned probabilities close to the historical base rate. As a result, the end users may frequently receive forecasts with decent calibration scores, but the forecast actually contains little value to them.

In contrast, the resolution or the discrimination characteristic focuses on the fundamental value of a forecast: its ability to capture the occurrence of an event with an underlying high hit rate, while maintaining the false alarm rate to some acceptable level. The Murphy and Yates decompositions analyzed the structure of the total forecast error and the impact or the relative contribution of each component to the total error, but they could not provide a stand-alone single measure for the discrimination ability of a forecast. In evaluating rare event probabilities, it is crucial to minimize the impact of the predominant outcome on the outcome score. More specifically, the impact of correctly identifying the frequent event, which is the primary source of the hedging, should be minimized. So a better approach to forecast performance should concentrate on the hit rate and false alarm rate of the infrequent event, instead of the “percentage correctly predicted” that is the very basis of *QPS*, cf. Doswell *et al* (1990) and Murphy (1991).

A simple and often-used measure of forecast skill, the Kuipers (or sometimes referred to as Pierce skill score) score (KS), is obtained by taking the difference between the hit rate ( $H$ ) and the false alarm rate ( $F$ ), where  $H$  is the proportion of times an event was forecast when it occurred, and  $F$  is the proportion of times the event was forecast when it did not occur. Given a decision threshold  $w$ , the contingency table for successes and failures for the event can be written as in Table 6. Then the Kuipers score can be calculated as  $H - F = (ad - bc)/((a + c)(b + d))$ . Assuming independence of the hit and false alarm rates, the asymptotic standard error of the Kuipers score is given by  $\sqrt{(H(1 - H)/(a + c)) + ((F(1 - F)/(b + d))}$ ; see Agresti (1996). Alternatively, based on the market-timing test of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Granger and Pesaran (2000) have suggested an alternative test for the significance of the Kuipers test,

$$PT = \sqrt{T}KS / \sqrt{P_x(1 - P_x) / \bar{x}(1 - \bar{x})}, \text{ where } P_x = \bar{x}H + (1 - \bar{x})F. \text{ Stephenson (2000) notes}$$

that if one of the two elements in a column of the contingency table is very large (*e.g.*,  $d$ ), then Kuipers skill score effectively disregards the other element (*e.g.*,  $b$ ) almost completely. This can be a limitation of the Kuipers score in evaluating rare event forecasts.

Rather, the forecast skill can better be judged by comparing the odds of making a good forecast (a hit) to the odds of making a bad forecast (a false alarm), *i.e.*, by using the odds ratio  $\theta = \{H/(1-H)\}/\{F/(1-F)\}$  which is simply equal to the cross-product ratio  $(ad)/(bc)$  obtainable from the contingency table. The odds ratio is unity when the forecasts and the realizations are independent or  $KS=0$ , and can be easily tested for significance by considering the log odds that is approximately Normal with a standard error given by  $\sqrt{1/a+1/b+1/c+1/d}$ . Note that each cell count should be at least 5 for the validity of the approximation.  $KS$  and  $\theta$  are reported in Table 7 for relevant values of the decision threshold  $w$ .

One important but often overlooked issue in the evaluation of probability forecasts is the role of the selected threshold. The performance of a probability forecast in terms of discrimination ability is actually the result of the combination of the intrinsic discrimination ability of a forecasting system and the selection of the threshold. In these regards, Relative (or Receiver) Operating Characteristic (ROC) is a convenient descriptive approach, but unfortunately has drawn little attention in econometrics.<sup>14</sup>

The decision to issue a forecast for occurrence or non-occurrence of an event is typically made based on a predetermined threshold (say,  $w$ ) on the weight of evidence scale  $W$ . The occurrence forecast is announced if  $W > w$ , the non-occurrence is announced otherwise. ROC can be represented by a graph of the hit rate against the false alarm rate as  $w$  varies, with the false alarm rate plotted as the  $X$ -axis and the hit rate as the  $Y$ -axis. The location of the entire curve in the unit square is determined by the intrinsic

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<sup>14</sup> This approach has a long history in medical imaging, and has also been used in evaluating loan default and rating forecasts, *cf.* Hanley and McNeil (1982) and Stein (2005). See Jolliffe *et al.* (2003), Stephenson (2000), and Swets and Pickett (1982) for additional analysis on the use of ROC.

discrimination capacity of the forecasts, and the location of specific points on a curve is determined by the decision threshold  $w$  that is selected by the user. As the decision threshold  $w$  varies from low to high, or the ROC curve moves from right to left,  $H$  and  $F$  vary together to trace out the ROC curve. Low thresholds lead to both high  $H$  and  $F$  towards the upper right hand corner. Conversely, high thresholds make the ROC points move towards the lower left hand corner along the curve. Thus, a perfect discrimination is represented by an ROC that rises from (0,0) along the  $Y$ -axis to (0,1), then straight right to (1,1). The diagonal  $H = F$  represents zero skill, indicating that the forecasts are completely non-discriminatory. ROC points below the diagonal represent the same level of skill as they would if they were located above the diagonal, but are just mislabeled, *i.e.*, a forecast of non-occurrence should be taken as occurrence.

In Figures 4a-4e the ROC curves together with their 95% confidence intervals for the current quarter and the next four quarters are displayed. The confidence interval was

calculated using the formula 
$$\frac{\hat{H} + \frac{z_{\alpha/2}^2}{2T} \pm z_{\alpha/2} \left\{ \left[ \hat{H}(1-\hat{H}) + \frac{z_{\alpha/2}^2}{4T} \right] / T \right\}^{1/2}}{1 + z_{\alpha/2}^2 / T}$$
 for each  $w$ ,

where  $z_{\alpha/2} = z_{0.025} = 1.96$  for a standard normal variate.<sup>15</sup> It can be seen that the ROC for the current quarter (Q0) is located maximally away from the diagonal towards the left upper corner demonstrating the highest discrimination ability of the SPF forecasts, followed by the one-quarter-ahead forecasts. For longer-term forecasts ROCs become rapidly flatter as the forecasting horizon increases. For the four-quarter-ahead forecasts, the ROC mildly snakes around the diagonal line, and the associated confidence band suggests that practically none of the values are statistically different from the values on the diagonal line. This means that the 4Q forecasts have no skill or discrimination ability for any value of the threshold. In situations where the analyst may have only vague idea about the relative costs of type I and type II errors (*e.g.*, in the problem of predicting the

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<sup>15</sup> The confidence interval is obtained by inverting the appropriate score test for sample proportions, and are asymmetric and non-linear in  $H$ . For reasonable values of  $w$  in our case (*i.e.*, around 0.25), it varied from approximately .09 for Q0 to .14 for Q4. Agresti and Coull (1996) have shown that this (score) confidence interval has excellent coverage probability for nearly all sample sizes and parameter values.

turning point in a business cycle), he or she can pick a comfortable hit rate (or false alarm rate) of choice, and the underlying ROC curve will give the corresponding false alarm rate (or hit rate). This will also give an optimal threshold for making decisions. When the relative costs two types of errors are known exactly, the decision theoretic framework developed by Zellner *et al.* (1991) and Granger and Pesaran (2000) can be used to issue recession signals. However, before using the probability forecasts in decision-making, the significance of their skillfulness should first be established.

The hit rates and false alarm rates for selected threshold values in the range 0.50-0.05 are reported in Table 7, where one can find the mix of hit and false alarm rates that are expected to be associated with each horizon-specific forecast.<sup>16</sup> For example, for achieving a hit rate of 90% with Q0 forecasts, one should use 0.25 as the threshold, and the corresponding false alarm rate is expected to be 0.16. Table 7 also shows that at this threshold value, even though the false alarm rates are roughly around 0.15 for forecast of all horizons, the hit rate steadily declines from 90% for Q0 to only 21% for Q4 - clearly documenting the rapid speed of deterioration in forecast capability as the forecast horizon increases. Though not reported in Table 7, for the same hit rate of 90%, the false alarm rates for Q1 through Q4 forecasts are 0.189 ( $w=0.237$ ), 0.636 ( $w=0.13$ ), 0.808 ( $w=0.115$ ) and 0.914 ( $w=0.10$ ) respectively. Thus, for the same hit rate, the corresponding false alarm rates for Q3-Q4 forecasts are so large (80% and 91% respectively) that they can be considered useless for all practical purposes, and thus, may have very little value in decision-making.

In Table 7 we have also reported the Kuipers scores (KS) and the odds ratios ( $\theta$ ) for selected  $w$ . The rapid decline in these values as the forecast horizon increases is remarkable, and for Q4 forecasts these values are close to zero and unity respectively, suggesting no-skill. Using the critical value 1.645 for a one-sided normal test at the 5% level, the KS and  $\theta$  values were found to be statistically significant for Q0-Q2 and

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<sup>16</sup> In order to save space, we did not report in Table 7 the values of  $w$  greater than 0.5. Moreover, these values were less relevant in our context.

insignificant for Q4 forecasts.<sup>17</sup> For Q3 forecasts, there is some conflicting evidence depending on the tests we use. Based on the standard error formula  $\sqrt{[H(1-H)/(a+c)]+[F(1-F)/(b+d)]}$  for KS reported in Argesti (1996), KS values for Q3 were insignificant at the 5% level for all allowable values of  $w$ . However, the PT test and the test based on log odds ratio for Q3 were statistically significant only for  $w = 0.25$  even at the 1% level. Notwithstanding this result, the weight of our previous evidence suggests that Q3 forecasts have very little skill. We should, however, emphasize that statistical significance or insignificance does not mean the forecasts have utility or value in a particular decision theoretic context.<sup>18</sup>

We find overwhelming evidence that Q0-Q2 forecasts have good operating characteristics. Given the relative costs of two types of classification errors, the end-user can choose an appropriate threshold  $w$  to minimize the total expected cost of misclassification. This type of optimal decision rule cannot be obtained by the Murphy-Yates decompositions of *QPS*. More importantly, for forecasting relatively rare business events like recessions, ROC and odds ratios are useful for making sure that the probability forecasts have operational value. This is because, in this approach, the success rate in predicting the predominant event is not part of the goodness of fit measure.

## 6. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have evaluated the subjective probability forecasts for real GDP declines during 1968-2004 using alternative methodologies developed in psychology and meteorology. *The Survey of Professional Forecasters* record probability forecasts for real GDP declines during the current and next four quarters. We decomposed the traditional *QPS* score associated with these probability forecasts into calibration,

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<sup>17</sup> Note that the cell counts were in excess of 5 only in cases of  $w$  values (0.50-0.35) for Q0, (0.45-0.35) for Q1, (0.30-0.20) for Q2, (0.25-0.20) for Q3 and (0.20-0.15) for Q4. The significance tests were conducted only for these cases.

<sup>18</sup> Granger and Pesaran (2000) show how, under certain simplifying assumptions, Kuipers score can be used as an indicator of economic value.

resolution, and alternative variance decompositions. We found overwhelming evidence that the shorter run forecasts (Q0-Q2) possess significant skill, and are well calibrated. The resolution or the discrimination ability is also reasonable. Q3 forecasts have borderline value, if at all. However, the variance of these forecasts, particularly during cyclical downturns, is significantly more than necessary. The analysis of probability forecasts, thus, shows that forecasters respond *also* to cues that are not related to the occurrence of negative GDP growths.

In contrast, Q4 forecasts exhibit poor performance as measured by negative skill scores, low resolutions, dismal ROC measures, and insignificant correlations with actual outcomes. Interestingly, the Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) test for perfect forecast validity failed to detect any problem with the longer-term forecasts. However, it is clear from our analysis that our professional forecasters do not have adequate information to forecast meaningfully at horizons beyond two quarters; they lack relevant discriminatory cues. Since the SPF panel is composed of professional economists and business analysts who forecast on the basis of models and informed heuristics, their failure for the long-term forecasts may indicate that at the present time forecasting real GDP growth beyond two quarters may not be possible with reasonable type I and Type II errors. Since survey probabilities embody important additional information over point forecasts, an analysis of the probability forecasts provided us with a unique opportunity to understand the reasons for forecast failures. As Granger (1996) has pointed out, in some disciplines forecasting beyond certain horizons is known to be not possible; for instance, in weather forecasting the boundary seems to be four or five days. Our analysis of probability forecasts suggests that in macro GDP forecasts, two quarters appears to be the limit at the present time.

We have also emphasized that for forecasting rare events, it is important to examine the ROC curves where the relative odds for the event can be studied at depth. The analysis also helps find an optimum probability threshold for transforming the probability forecasts to a binary decision rule. In many occasions the selection of the threshold is quite arbitrary. In this regard, ROC analysis provides a simple but an objective approach,

incorporating the end user's loss function for missed signals and false alarms. The ROC analysis in our case revealed that for a pre-assigned hit rate of (say) 90%, the associated false alarm rates for the Q3-Q4 forecasts are so high that they may be considered useless for all practical purposes.

Other interesting implications of this study are as follows: First, decomposition methodologies introduced in this paper have much broader implications for evaluating model fit in Logit, Probit and other limited dependent variable models. These models generate probabilities of discrete events. Again, often in economics, we try to identify events that are relatively rare or uncommon (e.g., loan defaults, hospital stays, road accidents, crack babies, etc.) in terms of observable predictors. Usually the model fit criteria look excellent, but the estimated model hardly identifies the small population of interest. Using the evaluation methodology of probability forecasts, one can study the true value of the estimated probability models for out-of-sample predictions.

Second, given the multi-dimension nature of the forecasts and the possible trade-offs between the different characteristics of the forecasts such as calibration and resolution, discrimination ability should be taken as an important characteristic with high priority for the end users. As the ROC analysis revealed, a fundamental issue for forecasting a binary event is to distinguish the occurrence of an event from its non-occurrence. A forecast with higher discrimination ability should certainly be considered a better one over others. As revealed by our analysis, a decent external correspondence may not necessarily represent a truly useful forecast. Instead, it could be just the result of the "hedging" behavior on part of the forecasters. Most importantly, a higher accuracy score can be achieved at the expense of lowered discrimination ability.

Third, considering the fact that the chronologies of the NBER recessions are usually determined long after the recession is over, negative GDP growth projections are probably a reasonable way of tracking business cycles in real time. We have found conclusive evidence that the SPF subjective probability forecasts for the near term are useful in this regard, even though these probability forecasts are characterized by excess variability. In principle, the quality of these forecasts can be improved by further

distinguishing factors related to the event from those that are not, while keeping the sensitivity of the forecasts to correct information.

One wonders if the SPF forecasters can be trained to do better. In the current situation, forecasting improvement may not be possible for various reasons. In most psychological and Bayesian learning experiments, the outcomes are readily available and are known with certainty; thus prompt feedback for the purpose of improvement is possible. In contrast, the GDP figures are announced with considerable lag, and are then revised repeatedly. Also, as we have mentioned before, correct and dependable cues for predicting recessions a few quarters ahead may not be available to economists. The excess variability of forecasts and the observed lack of discriminating ability may just be a reflection of that hard reality. It may be the same reason why model-based forecasts over business cycle frequencies have not succeeded in the past. Given the loss/cost structure facing the forecasters and lacking useful cues, issuing low probabilities for future recessions may be the optimal predictions for the forecasters under considerable uncertainty, particularly when the course of the cycle can be manipulated by government policies.

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
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
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
**Fig. 1a: Probability of Decline in Real GDP in the Current Quarter**




**Fig. 1b: Probability of Decline in Real GDP in the Following Quarter**



**Fig. 1c: Probability of Decline in Real GDP in Following Second Quarter**



**Fig. 1d: Probability of Decline in Real GDP in Following Third Quarter**



**Fig. 1e: Probability of Decline in Real GDP in Following Fourth Quarter**




Figure 2a: Attributes Diagram (Q0)




Figure 2b: Attributes Diagram (Q1)




Figure 2c: Attributes Diagram (Q2)




Figure 2d: Attributes Diagram (Q3)




Figure 2e: Attributes Diagram (Q4)




Figure 3a: Likelihood Diagram (Q0)




Figure 3b: Likelihood Diagram (Q1)




Figure 3c: Likelihood Diagram (Q2)




Figure 3d: Likelihood Diagram (Q3)




Figure 3e: Likelihood Diagram (Q4)






Figure 4a: ROC for  $Q0 \pm 95\%$  Band




Y-axis: Hit Rate; X-axis: False Alarm Rate

Figure 4b: ROC for  $Q1 \pm 95\%$  Band




Y-axis: Hit Rate; X-axis: False Alarm Rate

Figure 4c: ROC for  $Q2 \pm 95\%$  Band




Y-axis: Hit Rate; X-axis: False Alarm Rate

Figure 4d: ROC for  $Q3 \pm 95\%$  Band



Y-axis: Hit Rate; X-axis: False Alarm Rate

Figure 4e: ROC for  $Q4 \pm 95\%$  Band



**Table 1: Calculations for the Calibration Test: Quarter 0**

<b>Probability Interval</b>	<b>Midpoint</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Occurrence</b>	<b>Relative Frequency</b>	<b>Expectation</b>	<b>Weight</b>	<b>Test Statistic</b>	<b>Chi Square</b>
	$f_j$	$T_j$	$r_j$	$r_j/T_j$	$e_j = f_j T_j$	$w_j = T_j f_j (1 - f_j)$	$Z_j = (r_j - e_j) / \sqrt{w_j}$	$Z_j^2$
0.00 - 0.049	0.025	42	0	0.00	1.05	1.02	-1.04	1.08
0.05 - 0.149	0.100	51	0	0.00	5.10	4.59	-2.38	5.67
0.15 - 0.249	0.200	25	7	0.28	5.00	4.00	1.00	1.00
0.25 - 0.349	0.300	4	1	0.25	1.20	0.84	-0.22	0.05
0.35 - 0.449	0.400	3	2	0.67	1.20	0.72	0.94	0.89
0.45 - 0.549	0.500	6	2	0.33	3.00	1.50	-0.82	0.67
0.55 - 0.649	0.600	4	2	0.50	2.40	0.96	-0.41	0.17
0.65 - 0.749	0.700	3	1	0.33	2.10	0.63	-1.39	1.92
0.75 - 0.849	0.800	5	5	1.00	4.00	0.80	1.12	1.25
0.85 - 0.949	0.900	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.95 - 1.000	0.975	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		<b>143</b>	<b>20</b>				$\chi^2 = \sum Z_j^2$	<b>12.68</b>

**Table 2: Calibration Tests for Q0-Q4**

<b>Midpoint</b>	$Z_j(0)$	$Z_j(1)$	$Z_j(2)$	$Z_j(3)$	$Z_j(4)$
<b>0.025</b>	-1.04	-0.55	-0.23	-0.16	-0.16
<b>0.1</b>	-2.38	-2.37	-1.45	-0.43	0.37
<b>0.2</b>	1.00	-0.92	-1.00	-1.10	-0.93
<b>0.3</b>	-0.22	1.01	1.41	0.28	-1.57
<b>0.4</b>	0.94	0.15	-0.61	-1.63	0.00
<b>0.5</b>	-0.82	0.00	-1.89	0.00	0.00
<b>0.6</b>	-0.41	-0.94	0.82	0.00	0.00
<b>0.7</b>	-1.39	-1.46	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>0.8</b>	1.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>0.9</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>0.975</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
$\chi^2$	12.7	10.82	9.74	4.17	3.50
<b>QPS Test (N(0,1))</b>	-1.597	-1.481	-1.393	-1.137	-0.916

**Table 3a: Decomposition of Skill Score**

<b>Lead Time</b>	<b>SS (Skill Score)</b>	<b>= Association</b>	<b>- Calibration</b>	<b>- Bias</b>
<b>Q0</b>	0.3644	0.3930	0.0017	0.0269
<b>Q1</b>	0.1942	0.2202	0.0000	0.0260
<b>Q2</b>	0.0594	0.0774	0.0015	0.0165
<b>Q3</b>	-0.0019	0.0140	0.0059	0.0100
<b>Q4</b>	-0.0454	0.0000	0.0323	0.0130

**Table 3b: Summary Measures of Marginal & Joint Distributions of Forecasts & Realizations**

<b>Lead Time</b>	<b>Means</b>		<b>Variances</b>		<b>Correlation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
	$\mu_f$	$\mu_x$	$Var(f)$	$Var(x)$	<b>Coefficient</b>	
<b>Q0</b>	0.1969	0.1399	0.0541	0.1211	0.6269	143
<b>Q1</b>	0.1971	0.1408	0.0272	0.1219	0.4693	142
<b>Q2</b>	0.1868	0.1418	0.0123	0.1226	0.2781	141
<b>Q3</b>	0.1780	0.1429	0.0047	0.1233	0.1184	140
<b>Q4</b>	0.1806	0.1407	0.0040	0.1218	0.0017	135

**Table 3c: Summary Measures of Conditional Forecast Distributions Given Realizations**

<b>Lead Time</b>	<b>Means</b>		<b>Variances</b>		<b>Sample</b>	<b>Sample</b>
	$\mu_{f x=0}$	$\mu_{f x=1}$	$Var(f)   x = 0$	$Var(f)   x = 1$	$T_0(x = 0)$	$T_1(x = 1)$
<b>Q0</b>	0.1383	0.5573	0.0284	0.0632	123	20
<b>Q1</b>	0.1659	0.3875	0.0206	0.0258	122	20
<b>Q2</b>	0.1743	0.2624	0.0110	0.0139	121	20
<b>Q3</b>	0.1747	0.1978	0.0048	0.0039	120	20
<b>Q4</b>	0.1806	0.1809	0.0042	0.0032	116	19

**Table 4: Murphy Decomposition**

<b>Lead Time</b>	<b>QPS (Accuracy)</b>	<b>= Uncertainty</b>	<b>+ Reliability</b>	<b>- Resolution</b>
<b>Q0</b>	0.0793	0.1211	0.0153	0.0572
<b>Q1</b>	0.1018	0.1219	0.0108	0.0308
<b>Q2</b>	0.1150	0.1226	0.0135	0.0210
<b>Q3</b>	0.1226	0.1233	0.0062	0.0069
<b>Q4</b>	0.1270	0.1218	0.0155	0.0103

**Table 5: Yates Decomposition**

<b>Lead Time</b>	<b>QPS =</b>	<b>VAR(x) +</b>	<b>ΔVAR(f) +</b>	<b>MinVAR(f) +</b>	<b>(μ<sub>f</sub> - μ<sub>x</sub>)<sup>2</sup> -</b>	<b>2 * COVAR(f, x)</b>
<b>Q0</b>	0.0769	0.1203	0.0330	0.0211	0.0033	0.1008
<b>Q1</b>	0.0977	0.1210	0.0212	0.0059	0.0032	0.0536
<b>Q2</b>	0.1146	0.1217	0.0113	0.0009	0.0020	0.0214
<b>Q3</b>	0.1227	0.1224	0.0046	0.0001	0.0012	0.0057
<b>Q4</b>	0.1265	0.1209	0.0040	0.0000	0.0016	0.0001

**Table 6: Schematic Contingency Table**

<b>Event Forecasted</b>	<b>Event Observed</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Occur</b>	<b>Not Occur</b>	
<b>Yes</b>	<b>a (hit)</b>	<b>b (false alarm)</b>	<b>a+b</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>c (miss)</b>	<b>d (correct rejection)</b>	<b>c+d</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>a+c</b>	<b>b+d</b>	<b>a+b+c+d = T</b>

**Table 7: Measures of Forecast Skill: Quarter 0 to Quarter 4**

<i>w</i>	<i>Q0</i>				<i>Q1</i>				<i>Q2</i>				<i>Q3</i>				<i>Q4</i>			
	<i>H</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Kuipers score</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Kuipers score</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Kuipers score</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Kuipers score</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Kuipers score</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>
<b>0.50</b>	0.55	0.07	0.48	17.57	0.25	0.05	0.20	6.44	0.05	0.03	0.02	1.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
<b>0.45</b>	0.60	0.07	0.53	19.00	0.30	0.07	0.23	5.38	0.10	0.05	0.05	2.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
<b>0.40</b>	0.60	0.08	0.52	16.95	0.40	0.08	0.32	7.47	0.10	0.07	0.03	1.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
<b>0.35</b>	0.70	0.10	0.60	21.58	0.50	0.10	0.40	9.17	0.15	0.07	0.08	2.20	0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
<b>0.30</b>	0.85	0.11	0.74	44.12	0.75	0.14	0.61	18.53	0.35	0.11	0.24	4.47	0.10	0.08	0.03	1.37	0.00	0.05	-0.05	0.00
<b>0.25</b>	0.90	0.16	0.74	46.35	0.80	0.18	0.62	18.18	0.50	0.15	0.35	5.72	0.25	0.12	0.13	2.52	0.21	0.16	0.06	1.45
<b>0.20</b>	0.95	0.20	0.75	74.48	0.95	0.25	0.70	58.27	0.70	0.26	0.44	6.77	0.45	0.36	0.09	1.47	0.32	0.43	-0.12	0.61
<b>0.15</b>	1.00	0.23	0.77	-	0.95	0.37	0.58	32.51	0.85	0.53	0.32	5.05	0.80	0.66	0.14	2.08	0.74	0.66	0.07	1.42
<b>0.10</b>	1.00	0.40	0.60	-	1.00	0.66	0.34	-	1.00	0.81	0.19	-	1.00	0.86	0.14	-	0.89	0.93	-0.04	0.63
<b>0.05</b>	1.00	0.68	0.32	-	1.00	0.94	0.06	-	1.00	0.99	0.01	-	1.00	1.00	0.00	-	1.00	1.00	0.00	-

Note: *w* = decision threshold; *H* = hit rate; *F* = false alarm rate.